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Abstract 
Distributed Denial of service is a major threat to the availability of 
internet  services.  Due  to  the  distributed,  large  scale  nature  of  the 
Internet makes DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks stealthy 
and  difficult  to  counter.  Defense  against  Distributed  Denial-  of  -
Service attacks is one of the hardest security problems on the Internet. 
Recently these network attacks have been increasing. Therefore more 
effective  countermeasures  are  required  to  counter  the  threat.  This 
requirement has motivated us to propose a novel mechanism against 
DDoS attack. This paper presents the design details of a distributed 
defense mechanism against DDoS attack. In our approach, the egress 
routers  of  the  intermediate  network  coordinate  with  each  other  to 
provide the information necessary to detect and respond to the attack. 
Thus, a detection system based on single site will have either high 
positive or high negative rates. Unlike the traditional IDSs (Intrusion 
Detection System) this method has the potential to achieve high true 
positive ratio. This work has been done by using consensus algorithms 
for exchanging the information between the detection systems. So the 
overall detection time would be reduced for global decision making. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Denial  of  service  attack  is  a  major  cause  of  incorrect 
operation in the Internet and is arguably the most serious threat 
that the Internet community faces today. DDoS attacks generate 
a large volume flow to overwhelm the target host. The victim 
cannot protect itself even if it detects this event. So the detection 
and defense of DDoS should ideally be near the source of the 
attack or somewhere in the network. It is difficult to distinguish 
attack packets from legitimate packets. Attack packets can be 
identical  to  legitimate  packets,  since  the  attacker  only  needs 
volume, not content, to inflict damage. Furthermore, the volume 
of packets from individual sources can be low enough to escape 
notice by local administrators. Thus, a detection system based on 
single site will have either high positive or high negative rates 
[1][2].  Due  to  the  readily  available  tools,  “Flooding”  attack 
becomes most common DDoS attack. They intend to overflow 
and  consume resources  available  to  the  victim  [3].  When  the 
number of attackers is very large, the flows from each attacker 
can  be  very  small  to  detect.  So,  the  detection  based  on 
instantaneous deviation is  useless,  because  of the deviation is 
very small in flow [4] [5]. Most of the DDoS detection system 
models  are  based  on  traffic  flow  rates  [6].  As  many  new 
applications are coming up and End user’s behavior also varies, 
that is difficult to get a general efficient model based on traffic 
flow alone. 
Hence, we need a DDoS detection system which is not only 
based  on  traffic  flow.  For  that,  in  this  paper  we  proposed  a 
sequential  method  to  detect  DDoS  attack  quickly,  which 
captures  cumulative  deviations  from  a  normal  behavior  over 
time.  The effectiveness of attack detection increases near the 
victim and the effectiveness of packet filtering increases near the 
attack source. So that we have chosen the detection system in the 
intermediate location to get benefits in both ways as shown in 
Fig.1 
 
Fig.1. DDoS attack detection location. 
2. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
One of the major challenges in detection system design is to 
process packets at very high speeds, essentially when placed in 
back  bone  networks.  The  algorithms  for  high-speed  packet 
processing  continue  to  be  very  important  and  active  research 
area.  So,  we  used  a  comprehensive  test  method  in  the  local 
detection systems (in the edge routers). Due to the distributed 
nature  of  a  typical  DDoS  attack,  each  local  detection  system 
observes  only  partial traffic anomalies.  Due to this nature we 
designed the entire process with two levels: Local detection and 
Global detectionas shown in Fig.2. The combined belief of all 
local sequential method detection system (SMD) is considered to 
detect  the  DDoS  attack  globally.  This  is  achieved  by  the 
consensus algorithm. It is very much useful to reduce detection 
time and to reduce misdetection rates. 
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Fig.2. Two level architecture 
2.1 LOCAL DETECTION OF ATTACKS USING 
SEQUENTIAL TEST METHOD 
The Sequential Test Method has been implemented in each 
Egress router (DS). The Egress router is the one through which 
all  nodes  sends  the  traffic  (flow  of  packet).  Each  Detection 
system perform the sequential test and based on the confidence 
level  of  an  attack,  it  Will  send  attack  alert  to  the  Leader 
Detection  System.  The  Leader  Detection  System  consolidates 
and analyzes its local detection result with attack alerts received 
from  other  detection  systems  to  make  a  global  detection 
decision.  If  a  DDoS  attack  is  confirmed,  the  DS  notifies  the 
packet  filtering  component  to  install  packet  filters  for  the 
corresponding packet stream 
2.2 SEQUENTIAL TEST METHOD 
In each SMD we have two phases for detecting the anomaly 
namely 
Phase-1: Sequential test method  
Phase-2: Monitoring new IP addresses. 
 The  two  phases  raise  alarms  when  they  find  the  observed 
statistical ratio crosses some threshold. Based on the combined 
belief of the two alarms DDoS attack is confirmed as shown in 
Fig.3 
 
 
Fig.3. Two phases of SMD 
2.2.1 Phase-1: 
This is based on inherent request vs reply protocol behavior. 
We have taken TCP-SYN flooding attack. Here, a large number 
of TCP SYN packets is sent to victim’s server port. If the port is 
actively  listening  for  connection  requests,  the  victim  would 
respond by sending back SYN-ACK packets. However, since the 
source addresses in these packets are spoofed addresses, these 
response  packets  are  sent  elsewhere  in  the  Internet.  Thus  the 
victim retransmits the SYN-ACK packets several times before 
giving up. However, these half open connections will quickly 
consume  all  the  memories  allocated  for  pending  connections, 
thus preventing the victim from accepting new request. 
In the  Fig.3,  phase  1, the number  of  requests  and  number  of 
replies  are  calculated.  We  consider  a  time  series  {T1,  T2, 
T3,…Tn}. We find the number of SYN (opening connections) 
and FIN (RST) (closing connections) packets. For each sampling 
period we calculate the average number of replies R’. 
 n 
∑ Xi= Total number of requests – corresponding replies for  
 t=1                                               one sampling period  (1)            
Where Xi is the collection of observed data. 
This value is normalized by R’ as follows 
                             n 
                    ∆n = ∑   Xi / R’                                           (2)                     
                            t=1 
Now  we  consider this  ratio  for  deciding  hypothesis  and  raise 
alarm when it crosses the threshold value.  
i)   H = 0 (Null hypothesis) ---Normal situation 
     H = 1 (Alternative hypothesis) – abnormal situation 
ii)  Sequence of observed data 
  X1,X2,X3,…Xn 
iii) Decision consists of 
         - Stopping time N(stop taking samples) 
         - Make a hypothesis – H=0 (or) H=1 ?    
  Now as shown in Fig.4 the alarm is raised if the  
  ∆n value exceeds the threshold value N. 
 
Fig.4. SMD Detection method 
2.2.2 Phase-2: 
Monitoring the percentage of new IP addresses is effective in 
detecting the attacks. Over the same time series T1,T2, T3,…Tn, 
the incoming IP addresses are collected. Let F be the collection 
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of frequent IP addresses, and M be the collection of incoming IP 
addresses in time interval T. 
                             | M |  -  | M   U   F | 
                 Yn = ________________                          (3)                                                                                                                           
                                   |  F  | 
where Yn is the percentage of new IP addresses to be calculated 
in the time interval T. When this value Yn exceeds the threshold 
value say N, then alarm is raised. Normally Yn is calculated for 
the confirmation of DDoS attack. 
2.2.3 DDoS Detection: 
When both Phase.1 and Phase.2 raise alarms, based on the 
combined belief DDoS attack is confirmed as shown in Fig.5. 
Based on the values of ∆n and Yn the hypothesis is decided, and 
DDoS attack is confirmed.  
 
Fig.5. Decision making based on combined belief 
where P is decision function which is deciding over DDoS attack 
confirmation and H is the Hypothesis. 
There are two hypothesis to test on both levels: H1 for the 
presence of a DDoS attack and H0, a null hypothesis. The binary 
hypothesis is tested on the two phases of SMDs. As soon as the 
local SMDs support H1, the detection system involved passes 
attack  information  to  all  other  detection  systems  signaling  a 
possible DDoS attack. 
Each Detection system then independently consolidates and 
analyzes  its  local  detection  result  with  attack  alerts  received 
from  other  detection  systems  to  make  a  global  detection 
decision. For this purpose, each attack alert is attached with a 
confidence  level  that  quantifies  the  amount  of  evidence 
supporting the suspected attack. If a DDoS attack is confirmed, 
the DS notifies the packet filtering component to install packet 
filters for the corresponding packet stream. It also notifies the 
upstream networks to filter the attack packets as shown in Fig.6. 
2.2.4 Implementation of Consensus Algorithm: 
In consensus algorithm, the leader detection system receives 
attack  suspect  ion  from  other  DS’s.  Based  on  the  combined 
belief  of  majority  of  the  detection  system  (DS)  it  will  make 
filtering  action  and  sent  filtering  rate  to  the  majority  of  the 
system who suspect the attack. 
 
 
Fig.6. Two-level attack detection in the distributed detection 
approach. 
Consensus Algorithm: 
     A  group  of  processes  cooperating  to  provide  a  highly 
available service need to agree on which processes are currently 
functioning as members of the group. The consensus algorithm 
is explained in Table.1. 
Processes: Detection systems 
Service: Suspect and prevent DDoS  
Currently functioning members: Only few detection systems are 
selected among many to do the service 
Table.1. Implementation of Consensus Algorithm 
Algorithm: 
1.  The  server  (victim)  keeps  track  of  no  of  half  open 
connections. There are two threshold value are considered. 
               Threshold value first - HCf 
  Threshold value second - HCs 
2. There is a leader detection system. It  
                          gets all the allowed actions 
                            Chooses the outcome(filtering value) 
                            Tells everyone 
3. When the number of half open connections reaches HCf , 
then it passes the suspection to the consensus leader. The 
leader alerts all detection systems. 
4. In each detection system the sequential test is performed 
and based on that test, they raise alarm as follows. 
Each detection system passes the following information to 
the leader. 
                     (i)  actual incoming rate 
                     (ii) actual exit rate 
                     (iii) actual acceptance rate                                 
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Cont…                 
               (iv) Deviations  
￿ Percentage of unmatched request vs reply 
￿ Destined to the victim- DVum 
￿ Percentage of excess amount of  packets
    coming through the  detection system than 
                         the actual  acceptance rat -DVe 
5.  The  leader  detection  system  receives 
information from many detection systems that suspect and 
raise alarm. 
6.  The  leader  now  applies  the  consensus  among  these 
values and decides the outcome which is the filtering value 
to be applied in selected detection systems at the end. The 
leader  has  the  predefined  threshold  value  TV
deviation DVum. 
7. Now among the many detection systems involved, the 
majority group is selected by the following method. For the 
detection  systems  DS1,  DS2,  DS3,…DSn  ,  who  raised 
alarm, the following check is done. 
8. The DVum of detection systems DS1, DS2, DS3, DSn are 
checked  with  this  threshold  value  TVdev.  The  particular 
detection system DSi is included in the majority group if 
and only if the following condition satisfies. 
DVum of detection system DSi > TVdev 
Let the no of DS wins this check be ‘m 
9. Now to check the majority the leader has to decide the 
outcome only if (n-m) is greater than or equal to n/2.
10. Deciding the outcome (filtering value) 
      The Outcome (filtering value) =Max DVum 
         among the majority group/2 
11. This outcome is passed only to the members of majority 
group.  The  relative  value  is  then  calculated  by  the 
individual DS and filtering is done. 
12.  Periodically  the  leader  checks  the  no  of  half  open 
connections at the victim server. If it below HC
leader  instructs  the  DS  of  majority  group  with  the  same 
filtering  value.  (Here  the  it  checks  whether  the  actual 
packet rate converges to acceptance rate or not).If the no of 
half open connections is greater than or equal to HC
the  filtering  value  is  decided  as  Max  DVum  among  the 
majority group 
The process stops when all of the DS in majority group DS 
incoming converges or tphe no of half open connections at 
victim converges below HCf 
 
2.2.5 Detecting and Filtering the Global traffic: 
If the confidence level value exceeds confidence   threshold,   
then  it  confirms  the  attack  and  sends  the  response  to 
corresponding Egress router. Now the egress router (DS) will 
drop the packets from the corresponding destination node.
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coming through the  detection system than  
5.  The  leader  detection  system  receives  the  above 
information from many detection systems that suspect and 
6.  The  leader  now  applies  the  consensus  among  these 
values and decides the outcome which is the filtering value 
to be applied in selected detection systems at the end. The 
er  has  the  predefined  threshold  value  TVdev  for  the 
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majority group is selected by the following method. For the 
detection  systems  DS1,  DS2,  DS3,…DSn  ,  who  raised 
of detection systems DS1, DS2, DS3, DSn are 
.  The  particular 
detection system DSi is included in the majority group if 
9. Now to check the majority the leader has to decide the 
m) is greater than or equal to n/2. 
um  
11. This outcome is passed only to the members of majority 
group.  The  relative  value  is  then  calculated  by  the 
12.  Periodically  the  leader  checks  the  no  of  half  open 
victim server. If it below HCs,  then the 
leader  instructs the  DS  of  majority  group  with  the  same 
filtering  value.  (Here  the  it  checks  whether  the  actual 
packet rate converges to acceptance rate or not).If the no of 
equal to HCs, then 
among  the 
The process stops when all of the DS in majority group DS 
he no of half open connections at 
value exceeds confidence   threshold,   
then  it  confirms  the  attack  and  sends  the  response  to 
corresponding Egress router. Now the egress router (DS) will 
tion node. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The  Fig.7  shows  the  setting  up  of  a  network  topology. 
Configure 25 nodes. The Script is written using Tool Command 
Language (TCL) for front end to design GUI and C++ is used to 
design the back end for processing. Sou
as  blue  nodes  and  destination  nodes  are  represented  as  green 
nodes. Then the data packets are transferred from one node to 
other. In this topology, there are 24 nodes. They are 3 source 
nodes and 1, destination node. Packets are s
rate.  This  rate  is  evaluated  by  timer  by  extending  the  Timer 
Handler. Normal data packets are represented by Blue color and 
acknowledgment packets are represented by Red color.
Fig.7. Topology Construction with 25 nodes
In  Fig.8,  there  are  four  detection  system  (DS)  marked  as 
green color node and one leader detection system marked as blue 
color node. Now the victim system sends the attack suspection to 
leader DS (node 12). 
 
 
Fig.8. The victim (node 22) sends the attack alert to l
(node 12)
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ISCUSSIONS 
The  Fig.7  shows  the  setting  up  of  a  network  topology. 
Configure 25 nodes. The Script is written using Tool Command 
Language (TCL) for front end to design GUI and C++ is used to 
design the back end for processing. Source nodes are represented 
as  blue  nodes  and  destination  nodes  are  represented  as  green 
nodes. Then the data packets are transferred from one node to 
other. In this topology, there are 24 nodes. They are 3 source 
nodes and 1, destination node. Packets are sending at a particular 
rate.  This  rate  is  evaluated  by  timer  by  extending  the  Timer 
Handler. Normal data packets are represented by Blue color and 
acknowledgment packets are represented by Red color. 
 
Fig.7. Topology Construction with 25 nodes 
there  are  four  detection  system  (DS)  marked  as 
green color node and one leader detection system marked as blue 
color node. Now the victim system sends the attack suspection to 
 
Fig.8. The victim (node 22) sends the attack alert to leader DS 
(node 12)  
Fig.9. The leader node 12(leader DS) is sending the attack alert 
to node 6 (DS 2). 
Fig.10. DS 6 now suspects the attack. 
In this Fig.10, DS 6 now suspect the attack; it will perform the 
sequential test and send the result (threshold value) to leader Ds.
Fig.11. Detecting & filtering Traffic 
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Fig.9. The leader node 12(leader DS) is sending the attack alert 
 
 
In this Fig.10, DS 6 now suspect the attack; it will perform the 
value) to leader Ds. 
 
 
Thus  the  traffic  is  detected  and  filtered  using  Consensus 
algorithm. If the confidence level value exceeds threshold, then 
it confirms the attack and now the egress router (DS) will drop 
the packets. 
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Even  though  anomaly  based  IDSs  are  widespread  and 
successful  in  most  environments,  they  possess  various 
disadvantages,  too.  The  main  drawback  with  anomaly  based 
systems is that they can raise a high proportion of false alarms. 
IDSs  often  have  both  accurate  detections  and  missed  attacks. 
Depending on the type of alarm 2004] raised by the IDS and the 
actual intrusion scenario, following types of detection results are 
possible.  The  false  Positive  ratio,  typically  known  as  false 
alarms, these occur when IDS reads legitimate activity as being 
an attack. The following figures show
existing  with  the  proposed  algorithm
probability  that  each  detection  node  in  the  detection  overlay 
network  sends  local traffic  information  to
We vary the probability of consensus between 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 
1.0. The performance of this approach with different probability 
P used are shown in Fig.12. As we can see from the simulation 
results,  with  p=0.4  we  have  high  false  posi
because we adopt high initial drop rate. When the local detection 
system detects an attack as a result legitimate packets will be 
dropped dramatically. 
Fig.12. Performance analysis of consensus algorithm and Gossip 
algorithm
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
ENHANCEMENTS 
Distributed denial o f service is a major threat that cannot be 
addressed through isolated actions of sparsely deployed defense 
nodes.  Instead,  various  defense  systems  must  organize  into  a 
framework  and  inter-operate,  exchanging  information  and 
service, and acting together, against the threat. In this paper we 
proposed a global detection infrastructure by building an overlay 
network on top of the internet. The consensus algorithm is used 
to  detect  distributed  denial  of  service  attacks  by  information
sharing. Compared to the existing solutions, this method has the
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Thus  the  traffic  is  detected  and  filtered  using  Consensus 
algorithm. If the confidence level value exceeds threshold, then 
it confirms the attack and now the egress router (DS) will drop 
NALYSIS 
Even  though  anomaly  based  IDSs  are  widespread  and 
successful  in  most  environments,  they  possess  various 
disadvantages,  too.  The  main  drawback  with  anomaly  based 
systems is that they can raise a high proportion of false alarms. 
detections  and  missed  attacks. 
Depending on the type of alarm 2004] raised by the IDS and the 
actual intrusion scenario, following types of detection results are 
possible.  The  false  Positive  ratio,  typically  known  as  false 
ds legitimate activity as being 
show performance measure of 
existing  with  the  proposed  algorithm.  Let  P  represents  the 
probability  that  each  detection  node  in  the  detection  overlay 
network  sends  local  traffic  information  to  its  neighbor  nodes. 
We vary the probability of consensus between 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 
1.0. The performance of this approach with different probability 
As we can see from the simulation 
results,  with  p=0.4  we  have  high  false  positive  ratio.  This  is 
because we adopt high initial drop rate. When the local detection 
system detects an attack as a result legitimate packets will be 
 
Fig.12. Performance analysis of consensus algorithm and Gossip 
algorithm 
UTURE 
Distributed denial o f service is a major threat that cannot be 
addressed through isolated actions of sparsely deployed defense 
nodes.  Instead,  various  defense  systems  must  organize  into  a 
operate,  exchanging  information  and 
service, and acting together, against the threat. In this paper we 
proposed a global detection infrastructure by building an overlay 
network on top of the internet. The consensus algorithm is used 
istributed  denial  of  service  attacks  by  information 
sharing. Compared to the existing solutions, this method has the 
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potential to achieve high true positive ratio. This work has been 
done  by  using  consensus  algorithms  for  exchanging  the 
information between the detection systems. So the overall time 
consumption will be reduced for global decision making. This 
work  can  further  be  explored  for  locating  the  Zombies 
(compromised system) and for other types of attack. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Guangsen  Zhang  and  Manish  Parashar,  “Cooperative 
Defense  against  DDoS  attacks”,Journal  of  Research  and 
Practice in   InformationTechnology, Vol .38, No.1, February 
2006, pp. 69-74. 
[2] Haining  Wang,  Danlu  Zhang  and  Kang  G.Shin,"  Change 
Point Monitoring for the Detection of DoS Attacks", IEEE 
Transactions On Dependable and Secure Computing, Vol.1, 
No.4, 2004. 
[3] Wang, D. Zhang, and K. G. Shin, “Detecting SYN flooding 
attacks,” In Proceeding of IEEE Infocom’2002, June 2002. 
[4] Rocky.K.C.Chang,”Defending  against  Flooding–based, 
DDoS  attacks”,  IEEE  Communication  magazine,  Vol  40,    
No.10,    2002. 
[5] Mirkovic, G. Prier, and P. Reiher, "Attacking DDoS at the 
Source," presented at ICNP 2002. 
[6] John Haggerty, Qi Shi and Majid Merabti," Early Detection 
and  Prevention  of  Denial-Of-service  Attacks:  A  Novel 
Mechanism with Propogated Traced-Back Attack Blocking", 
IEEE Journal On selected Areasin Communication, Vol 23, 
No.10, October, 2005. 
 
 
   